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Ex Post # Ex Ante 
Determining Liability in Hindsight* 
Kim A. Kamint and Jeffrey J. Rachlinskit 
Participants in three conditions (foresight, hindsight, and a modified hindsight condition designed to 
ameliorate the hindsight effect) assessed whether a municipality should take, or have taken, precau- 
tions to protect a riparian property owner from flood damage. In the foresight condition, participants 
reviewed evidence in the context of an administrative hearing. Hindsight participants reviewed parallel 
materials in the context of a trial. Three quarters of the participants in foresight concluded that a flood 
was too unlikely to justify further precautions-a decision that a majority of the participants in 
hindsight found to be negligent. Participants in hindsight also gave higher estimates for the probability 
of the disaster occurring. The debiasing procedure failed to produce any significant differences from 
the regular hindsight condition. The results suggest that absent an effective debiasing technique, risk 
assessments made in foresight will be judged harshly in hindsight. 
Life involves risk and danger. The potential for accidental harm looms in every 
environment and situation. When careless conduct causes an accident, injuring 
people or damaging property, the American tort system obliges a party who has 
negligently caused damage to pay for it. The tort system recognizes that not every 
accident is the product of negligence. To obtain compensation, a plaintiff suing for 
negligence must prove four things: (1) The defendant owed a duty of care to the 
plaintiff; (2) the duty was breached; (3) the breach caused (4) damage to the 
plaintiff (American Law Institute [ALI], 1965, p. 4). Negligence law requires that 
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judgment of the second element, whether the defendant's conduct breached a 
duty of care, be based on the defendant's knowledge before the plaintiffs injury 
(ALI, 1965, p. 68). Yet, the legal system necessarily judges a defendant's conduct 
after the harm has occurred. Research on human judgment suggests that people 
cannot ignore a known outcome when assessing an event's likelihood-a phe- 
nomenon known as "the hindsight bias" (Fischhoff, 1975). In this article, we 
address the possibility that the hindsight bias may make precautions that seem 
reasonable in foresight look inadequate in hindsight. 
In most negligence suits, defendants are liable only for consequences arising 
from their failure to exercise "reasonable care" in avoiding injury to the plaintiff. 
Legal scholars have described reasonable care in terms of a cost-benefit analysis 
(ALI, 1965, pp. 54-57). As articulated by Judge Learned Hand, "if the probability 
[of an injury] be called P; the injury, L; and the burden [of precautions] B; liability 
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P"(United States v. Carroll 
Towing Co., 1947, p. 173). In effect, if an accident's cost multiplied by the prob- 
ability of its occurrence outweighs the cost of untaken precautions, a defendant 
may be found liable for breaching the duty of reasonable care (Grady, 1989). Judge 
Hand's formula has attracted widespread support and is "the negligence standard 
most often cited in legal discussions of the problem" (Brown, 1973, p. 194). In 
fact, it remains the fundamental description of reasonable care in tort law treatises 
(Keeton, 1984, p. 173), and is embodied injury instructions (Devitt, Blackmar, & 
Wolf, 1987, P. 138). It has even been applied to the causation element of negli- 
gence (Grady, 1983; Landes & Posner, 1983). 
In the application of the Hand formula to a defendant's conduct, a judge or 
jury must assess the costs and benefits of precautions based upon what the de- 
fendant should have known when making the judgment, regardless of what has 
been learned after the fact (ALI, 1965, p. 68). This requires making a post hoc 
evaluation of "what particular precautions the defendant could have taken, but 
did not" (Grady, 1989, p. 140). To correctly apply Hand's formula and determine 
liability, legal decision makers must make ex post (after the fact) judgments of the 
ex ante (before the fact) probabilities. In effect, a proper adjudication of reason- 
able care requires ajudge or jury to disregard the obvious fact that the precautions 
failed to prevent an accident (Devitt et al., 1987, p. 138). 
The Hindsight Bias 
Ignoring a known outcome while recreating a decision is a difficult cognitive 
task. In making such judgments, people overestimate both the probability of 
the known outcome and the ability of decision makers to foresee the outcome 
(Fischhoff, 1975). When trying to reconstruct what a foresightful state of mind 
would have perceived, people remain anchored in the hindsightful perspective. 
This leaves the reported outcome looking much more likely than it would look to 
the reasonable person without the benefit of hindsight (Fischhoff, 1982a, p. 343). 
Research on the hindsight bias has demonstrated the effect in a diverse range 
of subject populations across varied laboratory and applied settings. Detmer, 
Fryback, and Gassner (1978) reported a hindsight bias in surgeons appraising sur- 
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gical cases. Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, and Harkness (1981) found it among phy- 
sicians assessing a medical diagnosis. Pennington, Rutter, McKenna, and Morely 
(1980) found it in women reacting to the results of a pregnancy test. The bias has 
also been found in voters' election predictions (Leary, 1982), in nurses' employee 
evaluations (Mitchell & Kalb, 1982), and may contribute to the phenomenon of 
blaming a rape victim for her misfortune (Carli & Leonard, 1989). These studies 
suggest the robustness of the bias across a variety of subjects, situations, and 
tasks. 
The Hindsight Bias and Legal Decision Making 
The hindsight bias' potential relevance to law has not escaped the notice of 
legal and psychological scholars. In discussing a demonstration of the hindsight 
bias in medical diagnosis, Arkes (1989) claimed that the bias could affect liability 
judgments in misdiagnosis cases. Since a failure to diagnose a disorder will look 
much more culpable after discovering the true nature of an illness, doctors may be 
subject to liability even for reasonable diagnostic procedures that turn out badly. 
Wexler and Schopp (1989) expressed similar concerns about doctors sued for 
"negligently" releasing psychiatric patients who later commit violent acts. 
Researchers have conducted several empirical demonstrations of the hind- 
sight bias in legal settings. In a study by Bodenhausen (1990), undergraduates read 
case summaries containing the results of jury deliberations. The study revealed 
that the jury's conclusion heavily influenced subject evaluations of the defen- 
dant's culpability. Casper, Benedict, and Perry (1989) had students and adults 
called for jury service assess opening and closing arguments in a hypothetical suit 
against police officers who allegedly had conducted illegal searches. Although the 
legality of a search does not depend on its outcome, both types of participants 
were more sympathetic to the plaintiff when the search uncovered nothing than 
when it uncovered damning evidence against him. Kagehiro, Taylor, Laufer, and 
Harland (1991) extended Casper's findings, concentrating on the hindsight bias' 
influence on judicial review of third-party consent to warrantless searches. In 
their study, undergraduates read vignettes describing a warrantless police search 
and then responded to a questionnaire. Results indicated that search outcome 
heavily influenced judgments of the search's legality. 
Because decision making in a legal context differs from nonlegal demonstra- 
tions of hindsight, in both complexity and the influence that previously held 
attitudes have on its outcome (e.g., Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth, & Harrington, 
1984), one might suppose it to be immune from the bias' influence. These studies 
suggest otherwise. As these studies show, neither the attitudinal variables nor the 
complexity of legal decisions appears to mitigate the bias' effect. 
Tort law itself lacks a generic empirical demonstration of the hindsight bias. 
Although Wexler and Schopp (1989) provide a fairly detailed discussion of the 
effects the bias might have on psychiatric malpractice cases, they collected no 
data. Furthermore, Wexler and Schopp (1989) limit their discussion to psychiatric 
malpractice. In recognition of the generality of the effect, however, they include 
a comment by professor Robert Rabin that "negligent release cases appear simply 
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to be a variant on the general structure of accident law" (Wexler & Schopp, 1989, 
p. 489). As this comment indicates, the hindsight bias problem probably extends 
beyond psychiatric malpractice. Indeed, Saks (1986) has suggested that foresee- 
ability issues in tort law could occupy a lifetime of research. 
Debiasing Techniques 
Demonstration of pervasive bias in a significant area of law begs the question 
of a remedy. Unfortunately, the hindsight bias has proven resistant to most debi- 
asing techniques (Fischhoff, 1982b). Attempts to undo the hindsight effect with 
strategies that rely on motivation, such as suggesting to people that they try 
harder (Davies, 1987; Fischhoff, 1977), increasing personal relevance of the task 
(Connolly & Bukszar, 1990), and rewarding people for unbiased responses (Hell, 
Gigerenzer, Gauggel, Mall, & Muller, 1988), have proven ineffective. Further- 
more, alerting people to the bias' influence does not mitigate the effect (Fischhoff, 
1977; Kurtz & Garfield, 1978; Wood, 1978). Some researchers have obtained 
limited debiasing by significantly restructuring the decision-making task (Fisch- 
hoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1978), or by having participants consider alternative 
outcomes (Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 1988; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). 
Although these cognitive strategies have reduced the influence of the bias, no 
known technique completely eliminates the effect. 
Wexler and Schopp (1989) considered debiasing strategies suitable for the 
courtroom. They suggested bifurcating trials to avoid prejudice from knowing 
outcomes while judging negligence. Bifurcation of trials, in fact, may decrease the 
liability juries attribute to defendants (Horowitz & Bordens, 1990; Zeisel & Cal- 
lahan, 1967). However, as Wexler and Schopp admit, bifurcation is an imperfect 
solution. It is unlikely that the jury determining negligence could be kept com- 
pletely ignorant of the fact that an accident has occurred. Furthermore, although 
bifurcation of liability and damage issues is common, bifurcation to avoid out- 
come knowledge is unprecedented. Wexler and Schopp's proposal may be the 
only method for completely eradicating the bias, but it presents enormous prac- 
tical difficulties. 
A less intrusive courtroom technique would be to incorporate the successful 
cognitive debiasing techniques into jury instructions. As Wexler and Schopp 
(1989) explain, these instructions must do more than merely admonish jurors to 
disregard outcome information. Rather, they should employ successful debiasing 
techniques, such as imagining alternative outcomes. If written in plain language, 
reviewed before revealing the evidence, and then repeated at the end of the trial, 
these instructions might impact the decision-making process. Alternatively, ex- 
pert testimony could serve the same function, much as it does in cases involving 
eyewitness identification (Loftus, 1993). In addition, the defense attorney could 
make efforts to restructure the case to avoid the bias, or induce other decision 
making heuristics favorable to a defendant such as counterfactual reasoning-the 
mental "undoing" of an adverse event (e.g., Miller & McFarland, 1986; Wells, 
Taylor, & Turtle, 1986). 
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The Present Experiment 
The present experiment tested the influence of the hindsight bias in a negli- 
gence suit and the effectiveness of jury instructions as a debiasing method. The 
study compared participants' evaluations in an administrative hearing (choosing 
precautions for a potential accident) to those in a mock trial (in which an accident 
had already occurred). A second hindsight-trial condition was identical to the first 
except for the addition of debiasing instructions designed to reduce probability 
estimates and findings of liability. 
The stimuli in the present experiment depicted a situation similar to that of a 
famous tort case, Petition of Kinsman Transit Co. (1964). In the foresight condi- 
tion, participants learned that a city had constructed a drawbridge and needed to 
determine whether the risk of a flood warranted maintaining a bridge operator 
during the winter when the bridge was not in use. Hiring the operator would serve 
as a precaution. The operator would monitor weather conditions and raise the 
bridge if the river threatened to flood. The foresight condition asked participants 
without outcome knowledge to decide whether a flood was sufficiently probable 
for the city to appropriate funds for the operator. 
The hindsight manipulations contained the same background facts. The story 
continued, however, stating that the city had decided not to hire the operator. 
During the first winter of the bridge's existence, debris lodged under it. This 
resulted in a flood that could have been prevented had an operator been hired. The 
flood damaged a neighboring bakery, whose owner then sued the city. Participants 
in the hindsight condition were instructed to hold the city liable if the flood was 
sufficiently probable that the city should have hired the operator to prevent it. The 
second hindsight condition added a debiasing manipulation in which the judge 
instructed participants to recognize the influential effects of hindsight and to 
consider alternative outcomes as had the city in foresight. All three conditions 
required participants to base their decisions on a critical percentage derived from 
the application of Judge Hand's reasonable care formulation. 
The stimuli consisted of an audio-tape with an accompanying slide-show. 
Each subject heard one of the three versions of the stimuli (foresight, hindsight, 
or debiasing). Dependent variables were the participants' ratings of probability 
and their ultimate decision to hire the operator or hold the city responsible for 
failing to hire an operator. Other measures (whether the city should pay damages, 
how well the two opposing sides had done, how realistic the simulations were, and 
how difficult it was to decide the accident's probability) served as manipulation 
checks. 
The primary hypothesis was that participants in the foresight condition would 
be less inclined to take the precaution than participants in the hindsight condition 
would think they should have been. We expected these decisions to correspond 
with higher probability estimates generated by participants in the hindsight con- 
ditions. We also expected that hindsight participants would tend to think the city 
should pay for flood damages more than foresight participants would. For the 
manipulation checks, we predicted that hindsight would influence the case alone 
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and would not affect evaluations of the attorneys or the simulation itself. Finally, 
participants in the debiasing condition should give lower probability estimates and 
be less likely to hold the city liable than those in the hindsight condition. Since 
other studies show that this debiasing strategy tends to reduce the bias, but not 
eliminate it, we expected a similar effect in this study. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Seventy-six undergraduates at Stanford University, 37 women and 39 men, 
received either $5 in cash or course credit in an introductory psychology class for 
their voluntary participation in the study. 
Experimental Materials 
Separate transcripts for each of the three conditions (foresight, hindsight, and 
debiasing) were read onto audio-tape by actors. The tapes each lasted approxi- 
mately 30 minutes. The foresight tape depicted an administrative hearing of "The 
Duluth Urban Planning Committee," while the two hindsight tapes presented the 
same information in the form of a civil trial, Continental Bakeries, Inc., v. City of 
Duluth. Each role in the foresight condition had an analogous part in the trial 
conditions, and the same actors performed in all three versions. In the adminis- 
trative hearing, one member of the committee board advocated taking the pre- 
caution and played a role analogous to the plaintiffs attorney in the trial versions. 
Similarly, another administrator opposed the precaution, thereby assuming the 
defense attorney's position. The secretary of the committee mirrored the bailiff in 
the trial. A neutral chairman mirrored the judge. Six witnesses appeared in the 
same order in both the administrative hearing and the trial versions of the story. 
Where appropriate, multiple conditions contained recordings of identical materi- 
als. In all conditions, two exhibits discussed in the audio-tape were made available 
to the participants during the presentation. 
The presentational format was standardized as a slide-show with the accom- 
panying audio-tape. The slides presented different models posing as each of the 
characters. The background for the witnesses was a stark paneled wall; two wit- 
nesses were standing in front of a wooden door, while all the others were sitting 
in what looked like a wooden witness stand. Each condition used the same slides 
in the same order. The only exception was that the slides for the judge and the 
bailiff differed from those for the corresponding chairman and the secretary of the 
planning committee. These differences were necessary to show the judge in robes 
and the bailiff in uniform. Transcripts and all other materials are available from the 
authors on request. 
Opening Instructions 
The opening instructions in each of the conditions contained only those dif- 
ferences necessary to create the setting for the manipulations. The foresight tape 
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began with the committee chairman describing the administrative setting. The 
hindsight tapes opened with the judge describing the trial setting. Below are the 
actual instructions (with the hindsight text indicated in italics): 
First, [both parties have agreed to] let me give you an abbreviated version of the 
[situation/facts which are not in dispute]. [Last May/During May 1988], the City of 
Duluth completed construction of a drawbridge across the mouth of the Miniwapa river. 
The Miniwapa river sees a considerable amount of commercial traffic during the summer 
and early fall from many upstream businesses. During the months of December through 
April, the river is usually frozen. Hence, there is no commerce on the waterway in the 
winter. During the active months, the city maintains a bridge operator 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week, so that the bridge can be lowered or raised at any time. The city 
[presently is deciding whether or not to employ a bridge operator during the winter 
months/decided not to employ a bridge operator during the winter months. It is this 
decision that is in contention here today]. 
The foresight tape then explained: 
The City Disaster Preparedness Commission has alerted us to the fact that some 
possibility of winter and spring flooding exists as a result of the new bridge. A flood could 
be caused by a premature thaw or else by ice and debris getting caught under the bridge 
so as to create a dam. A flood would be a terrible event, potentially causing severe 
damage to property along the bank of the river. Employing a bridge operator during the 
winter and spring would alleviate this threat, but is fairly costly. The decision as to 
whether or not the city should hire an operator is the decision that is in question here 
today. I am torn between the two options. But two other members of our committee, Ms. 
Sugal and Mr. Markwell, have chosen sides and we will hear from a series of visitors to 
help you make your decision. My ambivalence arises from the uncertainty associated 
with the probability of a flood occurring. I would like you to review the available testi- 
mony to determine how likely it is that a flood will occur during the winter months. 
The hindsight tapes explained instead: 
During the middle of March 1989, the weather turned unexpectedly warm, and the 
normally frozen Miniwapa river began to thaw. When it thawed, the river approached 
flood stages and turned into a violent torrent, filled with ice floes. On the night of March 
17, 1989, the river crested at eighteen feet high, only two feet below the bottom of the 
new bridge. While this occurred, a barge broke loose upstream. This barge lodged under 
the bridge, and along with numerous large chunks of ice, created a temporary dam, 
blocking the flow of water under the bridge. This backlog resulted in the river flooding 
upstream before the bridge could be raised. Had the bridge been raised, it would have 
freed the barge and the ice and prevented the river from flooding. The flood only affected 
Continental Bakeries' property and a public park owned by the city. 
Finally, the debiasing tape included these additional instructions: 
Deciding this case will eventually require you to make a determination about the prob- 
ability that a flood like the described one will occur in any given year. Making such an 
assessment may be difficult since the accident has already occurred. When listening to 
the evidence, you should consider how the events which led up to the accident could 
have turned out differently. 
Testimony 
Following the opening instructions, the six witnesses were questioned by the 
committee members/attorneys. The opposing characters first made opening state- 
ments and then called the witnesses. 
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The first witness, a meteorologist discussing yearly water levels, testified that 
in the past 60 years the river had crested to dangerous levels on 14 occasions in 
five different years. He also introduced a memorandum describing each of these 
instances. On none of these occasions did the river rise to the level of the new 
drawbridge. The next witness, a civil engineer for the City Disaster Preparedness 
Commission, discussed the possibility that a flood could occur if ice, debris, or 
loose boats lodge under the bridge, forming a dam. This witness introduced a 
memorandum written by the City Disaster Preparedness Commission. The mem- 
orandum described several hazards posed by the new bridge, including automo- 
bile accidents, boat collisions, and flooding. It explained that enough ice or debris 
caught under the bridge could create a backlog and cause a flood. It also recom- 
mended that the city consider employing a bridge operator throughout the winter 
to monitor the bridge. The third witness was the accounting officer of the Planning 
Committee. She stated that the flood precaution (i.e., hiring an operator for the 
winter) would cost the city $100,000 annually, while the cost of the potential 
damages from a flood was approximately $1,000,000 per occurrence-ten times 
the cost of prevention on an annual basis. 
Next, the chairman of the City Disaster Preparedness Commission testified 
on behalf of the opponent/defendant. He attacked the credibility of the "over- 
zealous" civil engineer who had testified for the proponent/plaintiff. The second 
witness for the opponent/defendant was the current dock inspector. He stated that 
in his ten years of experience no boats had broken loose on the river during the 
winter. The final witness, a retired dock inspector, rebutted this testimony. He 
claimed that in his 40 years of service boats had broken loose four or five times, 
although under cross examination he could not specifically recall the occasions 
when this occurred. 
Closing Arguments 
Following the testimony, the opposing sides each made closing arguments to 
highlight the facts supporting their respective points. The proponent/plaintiff 
claimed that the flood was a likely event that should be/have been prevented. The 
opponent/defendant claimed that the flood was too unlikely to warrant the costs of 
prevention. In the debiasing condition, the defense attorney also asked the par- 
ticipants to imagine the possibility that the flood had not occurred, and to consider 
the waste of hiring a bridge operator "who would sit in a booth every hour of 
every day in the winter to watch for floods." 
Closing Instructions 
The tapes' closing instructions were as follows (the hindsight text is in italics): 
The law also gives you a clear definition as to which precautions are reasonable, and 
which are not. In deciding whether the employment of a bridge operator throughout the 
winter [is/was] a reasonable precaution, you must consider the economics of the deci- 
sion. If the precaution [will prevent/would have prevented] more harm than its cost, then 
the city is responsible for not taking the precaution. If, however, the precaution costs 
more than the harm it would have prevented, then the city is not responsible. When 
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making this determination, you must take into account the probability [of an accident 
occurring/that the accident was going to occur. This evaluation must be one of the 
probability that the flood would have occurred given the information available at the 
time the decision not to hire was made, not as of now]. 
The law makes the task fairly simple here. [We know that the damage from a flood 
would cost/The parties have stipulated to the amount of damages at] $1,000,000 [and the 
defense has stipulated that this is the amount of damage they predicted]. [The annual 
cost of eliminating the risk of the flood by employing the operator is/Also, both parties 
have stipulated to the cost of precautions]: $100,000. The only number missing from our 
calculation is the probability [of a flood/that the flood was going to occur]. It is your job 
to supply that number. Therefore, if you find that the probability of a preventable flood 
each year exceeds 10% then you must [agree with Ms. Sugal that the city should hire an 
operator/side with the plaintiffl. If you find that the probability of a flood is less than 
10%, then [you must side with Mr. Markwell that an accident is too unlikely to be worth 
the cost of hiring an operator/the city is not responsible for the flood since the precaution 
was not reasonable under the circumstances]. The [committee/court] has provided a 
special verdict form which includes these instructions. You are to fill out this form when 
deciding the case. [The committee thanks you for your participation as an auxiliary 
member/Thank you for your attention.] 
In the debiasing tape the judge added a final admonishment: 
Making a fair determination of probability may be difficult. As we all know, hindsight 
vision is always 20/20. Therefore it is extremely important that before you determine the 
probability of the outcome that did occur, you fully explore all other possible alternative 
outcomes which could have occurred. Please take a moment to think of all the ways in 
which the event in question may have happened differently or not at all. 
The Questionnaire 
After watching the simulated meeting or trial, participants received a three- 
page questionnaire. The questionnaire was entitled "Final Determination Form" 
in the foresight condition, and "Final Verdict Form" in the hindsight conditions. 
The first page asked participants to provide estimates for "the probability of a 
preventable flood in any year." It then asked them to give their opinion as to 
whether the city "should hire an operator" or "was responsible for the flood 
damage." On the next page, the questionnaire asked participants to provide a 
written explanation for their decisions. 
The final page asked participants to agree or disagree with five short state- 
ments using 7-point Likert scales. These statements were: "(1) The [proponent/ 
plaintiffs attorney] did a good job arguing her position; (2) The [opponent/defense 
attorney] did a good job arguing his position; (3) The City of Duluth should be 
made to pay for damages [if a flood were to occur because of the absent bridge 
operator]; (4) The [meeting/trial] simulation was realistic; and (5) It was difficult 
to decide the correct probability." 
Procedure 
Participants were run alone or in pairs. They entered the room and were 
greeted by a female experimenter who instructed them to serve as committee 
members or jurors in a decision-making task. They were told to pay careful 
97 
KAMIN AND RACHLINSKI 
attention to the slide and audio presentation that would describe the decision- 
making task. At appropriate times during the presentation, participants were 
given written copies of the exhibits being discussed. At these times the experi- 
menter said: "You will now receive a copy of Exhibit [A/B] to look over briefly 
and then refer to as it is discussed." Participants were instructed not to take notes. 
Upon completion of the slide and audio presentation, the experimenter 
turned on the lights and gave participants the "Final Determination/Verdict 
Form" and written copies of the closing statements and instructions. Participants 
run in pairs were instructed to work individually and to avoid discussing their 
answers. All participants were allotted ten minutes in which to complete the 
questionnaire. The participants were then debriefed about the background and 
hypothesis behind the experiment. At this time they were informed about all three 
conditions, told of the experimental predictions, and given the opportunity to 
discuss the experiment. 
RESULTS 
Preliminary analyses revealed no significant effects involving sex of subject 
and whether or not they were paid. Therefore, the results are reported collapsed 
across these variables. 
Of the participants in the foresight condition, only 24% (6 out of 25) chose to 
hire the operator, whereas 56.9% (29 out of 51) of those in the two combined 
hindsight conditions believed that the defendant should have hired the operator: a 
statistically significant difference, X2 (1, n = 76) = 7.3, p < .01. A similar analysis 
comparing the hindsight cell to the debiasing cell showed no significant differ- 
ences; 57.7% in the hindsight condition (15 out of 26) found the defendant liable 
versus 56.0% in the debiasing condition (14 out of 25) found the defendant liable, 
X2 (1, n = 51) = .01, p > .5. 
Two problems with the distributions of the probability estimates led us to use 
a nonparametric analysis on this variable. First, the distributions were positively 
skewed. Second, a smaller number of the estimates were extremely popular 
among the participants (e.g., 14 participants chose 5% and 11 chose 15%). This 
made a transformation somewhat meaningless and generally muted the level of 
variance in the data. Consequently, the data were analyzed using the Mann- 
Whitney Rank Test. Comparing the foresight condition with the two hindsight 
conditions revealed that participants in hindsight made significantly higher esti- 
mates of the probability that the accident would occur in any given year, U = 436, 
p < .025. Participants in the debiasing condition did not differ from the ordinary 
hindsight condition, U = 301, p > .5. 
Further analyzing only participants who chose to hire the operator (or to hold 
the city liable) indicated that the hindsight participants' likelihood estimates were 
only slightly, and not significantly, higher than the foresight ones, U = 86, p > .5. 
The mean probabilities were 15.85 for the foresight participants and 17.78 for the 
hindsight participants. Similarly, among participants who chose not to hire the 
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operator (or to exonerate the city) probability estimates did not differ significantly 
(foresight = 7.03, hindsight = 6.53, U = 183.5, p > .1). This suggests that 
participants could have first decided whether the flood was more likely than 10%, 
and then chosen a particular probability anchored on the 10% cutoff. 
The remaining data from the 7-point Likert scales (measuring the simulation's 
realism, the difficulty in deciding the probability, the effectiveness of the opposing 
advocate characters, and whether or not the city should pay damages) were an- 
alyzed using a 2 x 3 ANOVA, with main effects of choice (hire/hold liable vs. 
don't hire/don't hold liable) and condition (foresight, hindsight, and debiasing). 
Participants who chose to hire/hold liable agreed with the statement that the city 
should pay for accident damages significantly more than participants who chose 
not to hire or hold the city liable, F(1,70) = 15.7, p < .001. This rating did not 
differ by condition, F(2,70) = 2.0, p > .1. Nor did the interaction between choice 
and condition affect the rating, F(2,70) = 0.2, p > .5. Analysis of the participants' 
ratings of the simulation's realism and of the task difficulty revealed no significant 
main effects or interactions, F's < 2.8, p's > .05. 
Participants' ratings of the effectiveness of the proponent/plaintiff s attorney 
did not differ by condition, choice or their interaction, F's < 2.3, p's > .1. The 
ratings of opponent/defense attorney did not differ by choice, F(1,70) = .05, 
p > .5, but the effect of condition was significant, F(2,70) = 4.4, p < .01. (Means 
are 4.12, 3.00, 3.60, for foresight, hindsight, and debiasing, respectively, with 
higher numbers indicating a worse rating.) Post hoc analysis using the Tukey- 
Honestly Significant Differences test revealed that this effect was driven primarily 
by the low rating given by the hindsight participants in contrast to the foresight 
participants. No other contrasts were significant. The interaction between choice 
and condition did not significantly affect ratings of the defense attorney's effec- 
tiveness, F(2,70) = .67, p > .5. 
DISCUSSION 
These results demonstrate that the hindsight bias influences judgments of 
liability. In this study, outcome knowledge deeply affected participants' interpre- 
tations of a complex story. A majority of participants randomly assigned to the 
hindsight condition judged the choice made by over three quarters of the foresight 
participants to be negligent. As the study shows, a good faith effort to determine 
a reasonable level of precautions in foresight may receive harsh judgment when 
viewed in hindsight. 
The data did not support the secondary hypothesis; the judicial debiasing 
instructions failed to reduce the hindsight bias. There are several possible expla- 
nations for the ineffectiveness of the debiasing instructions. The instructions may 
simply have been missed or ignored in the context of the full trial. Research on 
jury instructions shows that they often do not produce their desired effects (Di- 
amond, 1993; Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973), or that they may even have a 
counterproductive influence (Thompson, Fong, & Rosenhan, 1981). 
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Alternatively, participants may not have actively followed the instructions to 
"consider how the events that led up to the accident could have turned out 
differently." Unlike this experiment, the successful debiasing studies all required 
their participants to actually state reasons why other outcomes may have oc- 
curred (Arkes et al., 1988) or to list supporting facts for various potential out- 
comes (Davies, 1987). Confined by the context of a court hearing, the present 
study indicates that merely encouraging participants to "imagine alternative out- 
comes" may not be adequate for reducing the bias. Although this study tested a 
technique easily suitable for the courtroom, its failure suggests that 'more intrusive 
procedures might be necessary to counteract the bias' influence. 
The data support the hypothesis that the hindsight bias would affect judg- 
ments of the events and not the characters involved. Participants' evaluations of 
the opposing characters' abilities and of the simulation in general did not differ 
between conditions, except that hindsight participants rated the opponent/defense 
attorney's performance significantly higher than did the foresight participants. 
This finding is difficult to explain, and the effect is in the opposite direction from 
what the hindsight bias might predict. Hindsight participants felt that the defense 
attorney did a better job, despite expressing more disagreement with his position. 
The meaning of this effect is unclear. 
There may be other limitations within the study, as well. Participants in the 
trial conditions were not given instructions on the plaintiff's burden of proof. This 
was to ensure that the two conditions were parallel, but it did result in a deviation 
from normal trial procedures. Since hindsight's influence was so large (57% versus 
24%), the effect should have occurred anyway, but this variance from normal 
procedures may have exacerbated the effect size. 
Additionally, the study tested individual judgments rather than those of a 
jury. The sample is unrepresentative of a typical jury pool, and no group deliber- 
ation occurred. However, researchers (e.g., Casper et al., 1989) have found col- 
lege student samples to display the hindsight bias in patterns similar to adults 
called for jury service. Furthermore, at present the effects of group deliberation 
on the hindsight bias are unknown. In reality, juries decide few civil suits. Bench 
trials have become increasingly popular (Hans & Vidmar, 1986), and more impor- 
tantly, the vast majority of cases settle before trial (Lempert & Saunders, 1986). 
Hence, the outcome of civil suits is determined primarily by attorneys and clients 
reviewing the merits of their case, or by arbitrators and mediators. This means 
that liability judgments are often decided by individuals rather than by groups. 
One might argue that data from undergraduates do not apply to the decision 
making of attorneys or arbitrators, but the robust nature of the hindsight bias 
across differing populations suggests otherwise. 
The differences in the instructions and testimony or even the basic differ- 
ences in format (meeting vs. trial) could also be said to account for the results. Yet 
differences in the instructions and testimony probably cannot account for the 
effect because there were so few. The instructions necessarily differed, as de- 
scribed in the methods section, but required the participants to make the same 
assessment. The substance of each witness' testimony did not vary, and the text 
itself was practically identical. 
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The basic format may have had some effect. While an administrative hearing 
demands an honest assessment of accident likelihood, trials tend to focus more on 
the assignment of blame. The possibility exists that these may be fundamentally 
different chores. In this study, however, participants in each condition were in- 
structed to base their decisions on their probability judgments. Furthermore, not 
only were hindsight participants more likely to judge the city liable, but they also 
estimated higher annual flood likelihood. This suggests that the hindsight bias, 
rather than a difference in tasks, drove the effect. Finally, even if the basic format 
made a difference, then the implications for law would be the same. Potential 
defendants who take what appear to be reasonable precautions in foresight might 
find their choices indefensible once being sued. 
One aspect of analysis indicates that something other than the hindsight bias 
may have driven the effect. After accounting for the decision to hire/hold liable, 
hindsight participants' probability estimates are only slightly, and not signifi- 
cantly, higher than those of the foresight participants. Thus, arguably the data 
cannot distinguish participants who decided liability first and then determined 
probability, from participants who decided the probability was greater or less than 
10% first, and then anchored their judgment on this point. Since anchoring is a 
well-known phenomenon (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982), finding it in a study with 
a salient probability should be expected. We suggest that although anchoring 
distorted the distribution of the probability estimates, there is no reason to believe 
it affected the way in which the hindsight bias drove the decision to find the 
defendant liable. 
In referring to the problem as a hindsight bias, however, we do not mean to 
suggest that supposedly reasonable minds in foresight do not err in assessing 
probabilities. It is possible that people underestimate the likelihood of that which 
has not yet occurred. Instead of "what did happen had to happen" (Fischhoff, 
1975), "what has not happened will not happen." This would be a foresight bias. 
In either case, the tort system promises to only hold defendants liable for the level 
of precautions that appeared reasonable to them before an accident occurred. 
Thus under any interpretation, the bias ensures that some reasonable defendants 
will feel ambushed by adverse liability judgments after an accident has occurred. 
Implications 
Finding the hindsight bias in a generic case such as this one indicates the bias' 
potential influence in any negligence case. Since all tort litigation necessarily 
involves such ex post judgments, any untaken precaution may later give rise to 
liability, even if that precaution could not reasonably have been justified ex ante. 
The data may be interpreted as describing a pervasive flaw in the deterrence 
model of torts. Under the deterrence theory, requiring negligent defendants to 
compensate plaintiffs forces them to internalize the full social costs of their ac- 
tivities (Posner, 1992, pp. 163-167). The theory holds that potential injurers 
forced to bear the full costs of their activities will make socially correct choices 
about the costs and benefits of precaution, spending neither too much nor too little 
on safety. The deterrence theory has always assumed that errors in such estimates 
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are random (Grady, 1983). To the extent that attorneys, judges, and juries reach 
estimates of ex ante probabilities that deviate systematically from the actual ex 
ante estimates, potential injurers will respond by spending more on safety pre- 
cautions than cost-benefit analysis would justify. 
Beyond the tort system, the hindsight bias may affect other areas of law, since 
foreseeability limitations pervade legal thinking. A computer search of the Cali- 
fornia Code reveals that the words "foresight," "foreseeable," "unforeseeable," 
and their variations appear in 193 different statutes. These range from statutes 
governing such diverse areas as attorney's fees (California Business and Profes- 
sions Code, Sec. 6146), endangered species (California Fish and Game Code, Sec. 
2067), pesticides (California Food and Agricultural Code, Sec. 12978), and earth- 
quake education (California Public Resources Code, Sec. 2806). The United 
States Code contains 179 such references and the laws of other states also include 
significant use of the terms (Illinois, 68 statutes; New York, 89; Texas, 80). Fur- 
thermore, the application of the Hand formula is enormously popular. The diffi- 
culty of fairly determining foreseeability in hindsight seems to have escaped the 
notice of the legislators and judges. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Given the present research, this article cannot offer a solution to the hindsight 
problem. As we have demonstrated, mere judicial instructions are apparently 
unable to activate the cognitive processes necessary to reduce the bias. Perhaps 
more effective instructions could nevertheless be drafted. Other solutions for bias 
reduction could include elaborate special verdict forms or Wexler and Schopp's 
(1989) suggestion on bifurcating trials. A special verdict form would contain a 
detailed set of instructions to the jury as to how they should decide the case. It 
could direct them to consider alternative outcomes and could even require them 
to write out such alternatives. Since Wiggins and Breckler (1990) have shown that 
special verdict forms improve comprehension of jury instructions in civil trials, 
perhaps such forms could improve the cognitive processes of jurors as well. 
Legal scholars have suspected for some time that the current standard of 
deciding negligence in hindsight may be inadequate (Green, 1977). The bias is 
likely to be influencing other legal judgments as well. The ubiquity of foreseeabil- 
ity judgments in law suggests the need for developing effective debiasing tech- 
niques. 
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